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In this paper we study the importance of marriage for interstate risk sharing. We find that US 
states in which married couples account for a higher share of the population are less 
exposed to state-specific output shocks. Thus, marriages do not just improve the allocation of 
risk at the individual level, but also have implications for the allocation of risk at the more 
aggregated state-level. Quantitatively, the impact of marriage on interstate risk sharing varies 
over divorce regimes. 
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Modern economies provide several formal and informal mechanisms through which the exposure
to risks at the individual, regional and country level can be reduced (see Cochrane, 1991, for
a detailed discussion). Financial markets, for instance, allow to insure against risks by holding
diversiﬁed portfolios. States introduce ﬁscal tax and transfer programs to provide risk sharing.
Labor contracts may also implicitly contain insurance elements (Azariadis, 1975). Thus, risk
sharing may in principle occur through various formal and informal channels.
Family economics emphasizes the idea that marriage provides risk sharing among a cou-
ple (Weiss, 1993). More speciﬁcally, voluntary transfers between spouses help to smooth out
ﬂuctuations in individual income streams. A large body of empirical studies using micro data
shows that risk sharing indeed occurs within marriages (see e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1985;
Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994).
In this paper we argue that marriages also improve the sharing of risks at more aggregated
levels. Consider for instance an adverse, region-speciﬁc shock, i.e., a shock that hits the popula-
tion of a certain region equally. The consumption risks associated with such a shock cannot be
diversiﬁed within the region, but only across regions. This type of inter-region risk sharing may
occur, for instance, via borrowing from a bank. So essentially risk is to some degree shared with
a bank in the region. The bank then diversiﬁes these risks across regions. In fact, Demyanyk,
Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007) show that risk sharing across US federal states occurs to a
non-negligible extent indirectly through banks. Since there is convincing evidence that being
married improves the availability of bank credit (Ladd, 1982; Elliehausen and Lawrence, 1990;
Munnell, Tootell, Browne, and McEneaney, 1996), marriage should foster this type of risk shar-
ing.1 That is, marriage may not only help to pool individual risks, but may also reduce the
exposure to region-speciﬁc shocks. It follows that marriages may give rise to additional welfare
gains beyond those associated with the pooling of individual risks.
The purpose of this paper is to explore empirically the inﬂuence of trends in marriage and
divorce on risk sharing across US federal states. Thus, we combine two important strands of
the economic literature studying risk sharing. The ﬁrst strand quantiﬁes the amount of risk
sharing across regions. The second strand emphasizes risk sharing implications of marriage at
an individual level. The main contribution of our paper is fruitfully bringing together these two
1Banks may prefer married applicants since they share all sorts of risk with their spouse and consequently
default risk should be lower compared to their single counterparts. In this sense, marital status is an eﬀective
screening device which can be observed with low cost.
2strands of literature that have so far remained largely separate. In fact, this is the ﬁrst study
providing empirical evidence that a more eﬃcient allocation of risk at the individual level has
also implications for the allocation of risk at the more aggregated level. Moreover, our ﬁndings
add to each strand in further substantive dimensions.
Based on the framework proposed by Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996), we ﬁnd that
states with higher shares of married population in the total adult state population are indeed
less exposed to state-speciﬁc output shocks. This result is consistent with our main hypothesis
that marriages do not just improve the allocation of risk at the individual level, but also at
the state-level. In addition, by showing that the risk sharing beneﬁts associated with marriages
add up and can be detected in aggregated state-level data, our paper complements the existing
research on the role of marriage for risk sharing employing micro data.
The eﬀect of marriages on the availability of bank loans and thus on interstate risk sharing
may be inﬂuenced by the degree to which risks are shared within marriages. It is often conjec-
tured that a high risk of divorce is associated with a low level of (ﬁnancial) co-operation during
marriage (Anderberg, 2007). Consequently, the likelihood of divorce should decrease in the cost
of divorce and in the couples’ match quality. In order to observe an exogenous variation in
the divorce propensity we exploit the diﬀerent timing of divorce law reforms across US states.
In particular, we explore the move from mutual consent to unilateral divorce laws (see Clark,
1999) and changes in the laws regarding the division of matrimonial property. These divorce
law reforms aﬀected the incentive to invest in marriage-speciﬁc capital (Stevenson, 2007) and
the selection into marriage (Rasul, 2006; Matouschek and Rasul, 2008), i.e. the match quality
of the average couple. Our results show that the positive eﬀect of marriages on risk sharing is
lower in states allowing for unilateral divorce. This supports the idea that risk sharing under
incomplete contracts increases in the cost of default (Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, 2002).
Concerning the division of matrimonial property, we analyze the move from common property
to an equitable property division. This reform makes it easier for banks to assess the net worth
of creditors after a potential divorce, and therefore banks should prefer to lend to married
couples under equitable property division. Accordingly, we ﬁnd that a divorce regime with more
equitable division of property indeed improves the eﬀect of marriage on interstate risk sharing.
In addition, our results indicate that the eﬀect of marriage on interstate risk sharing diﬀers
across periods of economic down and upturns. We ﬁnd some evidence suggesting that marriages
improve risk sharing when it is most needed, namely during downturns. More speciﬁcally, the
higher the share of marriages, the lower the exposure to state-speciﬁc risk during periods when
3the growth rate of gross state product is below average.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section2 we discuss our main hy-
pothesis that marriages increase intra- as well as interstate risk sharing. Section3 outlines the
empirical implementation, while Section 4 describes our data set. In Section5 we present our
estimation results. Finally, in Section6 we conclude the paper.
2 Marriage and Risk Sharing within and across States
In this section we motivate our hypothesis that marriages may be related to the degree to which
consumption risks can be pooled across states.
Becker (1973, 1974) introduced the idea that marriage is a partnership for the purpose
of joint production and joint consumption. The economic gains from marriage are given by
specialization, economies of scale, sharing of non-rival goods and, the concern of our research,
risk sharing. For concreteness, consider a married couple where each spouse receives an income
each period and their incomes are not perfectly correlated. If individual incomes ﬂuctuate over
time the spouse can smooth their consumption by engaging in risk-sharing through voluntary
transfers.
This type of risk sharing has been emphasized as particularly relevant in developing economies
where the access to ﬁnancial markets is limited and formal insurance arrangements are essen-
tially absent. However, as emphasized by Hess (2004) and Chami and Hess (2005), the risk
sharing implications of marriages can also explain a non-negligible fraction of the marriage and
divorce trends in the US. Thus, even in the US where ﬁnancial markets are highly developed, risk
sharing provided through marriage plays a role. In fact, the institution of marriage may even
be superior to conventional insurance markets. Since marriages involve a certain level of trust
and information, it may alleviate problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and deception
(Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak, 1981) which are typically associated with insurance markets. Moreover,
by providing insurance within marriage, transaction costs may be lower than those associated
with formal insurance and ﬁnancial markets.
Thus, marriages may lead to improved risk sharing among couples and therefore helps to
pool individual risks. In this paper, we go one step further and analyze if marriages also help
to pool state-speciﬁc risks. That is, risks which can only be diversiﬁed across states but not
within states. We argue that marriages may improve interstate risk sharing by increasing the
access to bank credit. While agents can share risks with residents of other states directly by
4exchanging claims on their outputs, they may also share these risks indirectly via banks.2 This
type of indirect sharing via an intermediary appears to be particularly relevant, since the direct
participation of households in ﬁnancial markets is limited even in the US, see e.g. Korniotis
and Kumar (2007).
So, at the intrastate-level, banks share risks with the residents of a state, and at the interstate-
level, banks then diversify these risks across states. This diversiﬁcation is done either via out-
of-state borrowing and lending or via the cross-ownership of banks across states. Demyanyk,
Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007) and Hoﬀmann and Shcherbakova (2007) present evidence show-
ing that banks indeed play a substantial role in the sharing of risks across states in the US.
However, the availability of bank credit is an important prerequisite for this type of risk
sharing to work and a substantial literature argues that informational frictions may lead to
situations where the access to credit is limited. Thus, agents are likely to face constraints on
the market for bank loans which limits the extent of risk sharing within and also across states.
Korniotis and Kumar (2007) ﬁnd that states with greater constraints are more exposed to
idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, several studies ﬁnd that banks discriminate on the basis of marital
status (Ladd, 1982; Elliehausen and Lawrence, 1990; Munnell et al., 1996).3 It is plausible that
these constraints are less binding for married couples, since family incomes may be less volatile
due to intra-family risk-sharing. Put diﬀerently, expected future family income streams are more
predictable than individual income streams. So essentially, marriage may serve as a substitute
for collateral. Thus, credit constraints may be less binding for married couples since they can
more easily borrow against their expected future incomes. In Table5 in the Appendix we provide
empirical evidence using a cleaned data set from Munnell et al. (1996), provided by Hunter and
Walker (1996), on loan applications collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Our probit
analysis shows that – controlling for many other factors such as income, wealth and credit ratings
– being married increases the probability of loan approval by 4.5 percentage points.
Accordingly, we expect that the access to bank credit is more widely spread in states where
a higher share of the population is married. Therefore, we expect a higher degree of risk sharing
between residents and banks within a given state. And since banks, in turn, are able to diversify
a larger fraction of the state-speciﬁc risk across states, we also expect to see less exposure to
2Boot (2000) provides a general discussion of banks in the context of risk sharing.
3This discrimination occurs despite the fact that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act was amended in 1976 to
ensure that all consumers are given an equal chance to obtain credit. In particular, it is unlawful for any creditor
to discriminate against any applicant on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age
(provided the applicant has the capacity to contract).
5state speciﬁc shocks in states which are characterized by relatively more married couples.
Of course, risk sharing arrangements are in principle not conﬁned to a married couple.
They can certainly apply to any human partnership. For instance, cohabiting couples can also
coordinate their activities and share consumption risks. However, empirical evidence shows that
cohabiting couples are much less likely than married couples to pool ﬁnancial resources, are more
likely to postulate that each partner is responsible for supporting himself or herself ﬁnancially
and are less likely to agree on the future of their relationship (Blumstein and Schwartz, 1983;
Waite, 1995). This uncertainty clearly reduces both investment in the relationship and the
ability to pool risks. Moreover, from a legal perspective cohabitation has some but not all of the
characteristics of marriage. In particular, married spouses in general face legal restrictions on
their relationship that forces them to cooperate. Therefore, it is reasonable that banks prefer a
married creditor compared to a cohabitating counterpart.
Note also that, if the thread-point of divorce hangs in the air and the transfers cannot be
fully legally enforced the eﬃcient level of transfers is endangered. Therefore, in reality the risk
of divorce my prevent couples from (full) risk sharing. Consequently, the amount of risk sharing
within marriage and across states depends on the likelihood of divorce. In order to explore
the eﬀect of divorce propensity on interstate risk sharing we will exploit exogenous variation in
divorce legislation in Section5.1.
3 Empirical Implementation
Our empirical analysis is based on the approach advocated by Asdrubali et al. (1996) to quantify
risk sharing among US federal states. Intuitively, this approach reﬂects the idea that if idiosyn-
cratic risks are perfectly insured, then the growth rates of state consumption and state output
should be uncorrelated. More speciﬁcally, under complete markets, the necessary conditions
for an eﬃcient allocation of risk imply that the intertemporal rates of substitution have to be
equalized across the agents in the regions. If we additionally assume that preferences can be rep-
resented by constant relative risk aversion utility functions, we obtain that consumption growth
rates have to equalize across regions: ∆logcit = ∆logcjt, for the i,j = 1,...,N states, where
cit denotes real per capita consumption in state i at time t and ∆ is the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator.
Since this condition holds for any two states, it must also hold with respect to aggregate US
consumption denoted by ct: ∆logcit = ∆logct.
Hence, state-speciﬁc consumption growth is determined only by aggregate US consumption
6growth and not by idiosyncratic risk factors such as state output. Intuitively, the impact of
ﬂuctuations in state output is completely diversiﬁed away under complete markets. However,
if complete insurance is not feasible, then state output may inﬂuence state consumption to
some extent. To obtain a proxy for state-speciﬁc output, we follow Asdrubali et al. (1996) and
subtract the growth rate of aggregate US output growth: ˜ yit = ∆logyit − ∆logyt, where yt is
the population weighted average of yit. This transformation eliminates movements in output
growth that are common to all states and can therefore not be diversiﬁed across states. Thus,
we obtain: ˜ cit = β˜ yit, where ˜ cit = ∆logcit − ∆logct.
Empirical estimates of the extent of risk sharing are obtained by running a panel regression
of idiosyncratic consumption growth on idiosyncratic output growth:
˜ cit = αi + β˜ yit + it, (1)
where αi denote state-speciﬁc eﬀects and it is the error term.4
If β = 0, the allocation corresponds to what we obtain under complete markets and con-
sumption growth does not respond to output growth. That is, any inﬂuences of idiosyncratic
movements in output are completely diversiﬁed away and we have perfect risk sharing. In con-
trast, β = 1 indicates no risk sharing at all, since consumption growth perfectly tracks income
growth. In this case, agents are not able to smooth consumption at the state-level and we
observe a complete lack of risk sharing.
Asdrubali et al. (1996) show that in addition to these two extreme cases, 0 < β < 1 also
provides a quantitative measure of the extent of risk sharing. More speciﬁcally, they show that
β can be interpreted as the fraction of total risk that is not shared across states.
In our empirical analysis, we specify β in (1) as:
β = β0 + β1xit. (2)
So essentially we augment (1) by adding interaction terms that capture the inﬂuence of ˜ yit on
˜ cit via xit. Depending on the precise speciﬁcation, the interaction variable, xit, will be the
share of the married population in the total adult state population. In further speciﬁcations
we will allow xit to have a varying impact across diﬀerent regimes (e.g. divorce law regimes).
The coeﬃcient β0 gives the average exposure to state-speciﬁc shocks. What we are primarily
interested in is how xit inﬂuences the overall degree of risk sharing as measured by β1. To avoid
4Equations similar to (1) have been estimated by Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991), with micro data and by
Lewis (1996), among others, with international data.
7potential mis-speciﬁcations, we allow xit to have a direct inﬂuence on ˜ cit by adding xit directly
to our estimating equation.
4 Data
For our analysis, we use panel data from 1969 through 1990 for all states (excluding Nevada)5
and the District of Columbia. We proxy yit by the gross state product (GSP). Since consumption
data are not available, we use state retail sales scaled by the ratio of total private consumption
to total US retail sales to proxy for state consumption, cit, as it is standard in the risk sharing
literature (see e.g. Asdrubali et al., 1996). Both yit and cit are deﬂated by the index for personal
consumption expenditure and in per capita terms. US aggregate output and consumption are
calculated as the population weighted averages: ct =
P50
i=1 wicit, and yt =
P50
i=1 wiyit where wi
is the population of state i as a proportion of the total US population.
In our analysis, we will employ three diﬀerent measures for the incidence of marriage, Mk
it,
where Mk
it is either the share of married females in the adult female population (k = f), the
share of married males in the adult male population (k = m), or an average of both (k = a).
Data on the married adult population are not readily available, except for the years in which the
decennial US census has been conducted.6 We overcome this problem by bringing together data
from the decennial US Census from 1960 to 1990, information on the ﬂow into marriage and
out of marriage and the age distribution on a state-level.7 For each state we take the number of
married women in 1960, add the absolute number of marriages and subtract the absolute number
of divorces of the years 1961 to 1969. Then we compare the resulting number with the actual
number of married women in 1970. In most of the cases the diﬀerence between our auxiliary
number and the actual number of married women is positive, i.e. the deaths and migration of
married women outweigh the immigration of married women. In 17.3 percent of the cases we
observe a negative diﬀerence, which means that we observe net immigration of married women.
Then we assume that the sum of deaths and (im)migration of married women is constant between
1961 and 1969 and distribute the diﬀerence over the years 1961 to 1969 equally. An equivalent
5We disregard Nevada from our analysis since its marriage market seems to be very diﬀerent compared to
the other states. Considering the whole time period, we see that the average marriage rate of Nevada is about
fourteen times higher than the average of all other states. Its divorce rate is more than triple of the average over
the rest of the US.
6In principal the Current Population Survey can be used to construct a proxy of the share of married adult
population on a state-level. However 32 states are grouped together between 1968 and 1972 and 38 states cannot
be separately identiﬁed between 1973 and 1976. In these years, up to ﬁve states share the same code.
7We have hand-entered the absolute number of marriages and divorces from the annual editions of the Vital
Statistics for all the states from 1969 to 1990. The data on the age distribution of the state population are from
the Reading Survey of Epidemiology and End Results provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
8procedure is applied for the 1970s to 1990s and also to obtain a proxy for the number of married
men. To obtain the share of married females/males in the total adult state population, we divide
the number of married females/males by the number of females/males 15 years of age and older.
The number of married females within a state does not exactly equal the number of married
males. This can be explained by diﬀerent principal residences of spouses, for instance, due to
weekly commuting. However, this diﬀerence turns out to be rather small. In our sample the
diﬀerence between the number of married males and married females is on average about 0.1




it may diﬀer since the number of females and males (the denominators) do not have
to be equal. Thus, we are able to draw some conclusions on gender-speciﬁc eﬀects. We also
include speciﬁcations where we control for the sex-distribution of state i.
Over our sample period the American family has undergone some changes: Marriage rates
have been falling over the last thirty years. Divorce rates have risen sharply since the mid-1960s,
peaked in the early 1980s and have been declining since then (see Figure 1) in the Appendix.
This downturn can partly be explained by the decline in the incidence of marriage but is also due
to greater marital stability of younger cohorts (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007a,b). As a result of
these developments of ﬂows in and out of marriage we observe a decline in the stock of married
people. In 1969 about 64 percent of the adult US population was married; by 1990 this number
had fallen to 56 percent. Figure 2 in the Appendix highlights the substantial variation across
states.
From all variables we subtract the overall mean since this transformation simpliﬁes the
interpretation of coeﬃcients when interaction terms are included. Our method of estimation is
ordinary least squares and we calculate robust standard errors – allowing for clustering by states
and heteroskedasticity of unknown form – throughout the paper.
5 Estimation Results
Our main hypothesis is that married couples are able to share a larger fraction of their idiosyn-
cratic risk. As argued above, via a readier access to credit, marriages may enhance risk sharing
not just within states, but also across states. To investigate the role of marriages, we allow β in
(1) to depend on the share of the married adult population, Mk
it:




it is either the share of married females, males or an average of both. In each speciﬁ-
cation we control for state ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects and we include Mk
it as a regressor.8 If
marriages generally improve the interstate allocation of risk, we expect consumption growth to
respond less to output growth in states with higher shares of married individuals: βk
1 < 0.
Table 1: Risk Sharing and Marriages.a
Specification (I) (II) (III)
k = a k = f k = m
GSP 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.163*** 0.129***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.045)
GSP · M
k -0.013* -0.016*** -0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
M
k -0.095 0.045 -0.184
(0.130) (0.140) (0.110)
Constant 0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.012
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
No. of observations 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100
R-squared 0.067 0.071 0.072 0.070
a The dependent variable is a proxy for state consumption (state retail
sales scaled by the ratio of total private consumption to total US retail
sales). Each speciﬁcation controls for year ﬁxed eﬀects and state ﬁxed
eﬀects. Estimated using ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors
(allowing for clustering by states and heteroskedasticity of unknown form)
in parentheses below. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the
10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level.
Table1 shows the estimation results. The ﬁrst line shows the point estimates of β0, which is
the average exposure to idiosyncratic risk. The baseline speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst column indicates
that on average, states are able to smooth approximately 86.3 percent of ﬂuctuations in state
output. This result is roughly in line, albeit slightly higher than what Asdrubali et al. (1996)
report. The remaining columns show the estimation results for the case when β depends on the
share of married individuals. Regardless of what measure for the share of married population
is used, we obtain a negative point estimate for β1. Therefore, our results suggest that a higher
share of married population reduces the exposure to idiosyncratic state income. Considering
speciﬁcation (I), we observe that an increase in the share of married population by one percentage
point (sample mean is equal to 58.9 percent) is associated with an increase in risk sharing by
1.3 percentage points. This quantitatively important eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 6-
percent level. Speciﬁcation (II) employs the share of married females (sample mean is equal to
56.6 percent). In contrast to speciﬁcation (I) the observed eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the
8To conserve space, the results for the state and year ﬁxed eﬀects are not displayed in the tables below, but
can be obtained from the authors on request.
101-percent level and quantitatively larger. An increase in the share of married females by one
percentage point is associated with an increase in risk sharing by 1.6 percentage points. If we
use the fraction of married males (speciﬁcation (III)) the coeﬃcient is negative, as expected, but
not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Thus, it appears to be particularly relevant
that the share of married females is relatively high.
Although it is hard to pin down why the share of married females is more relevant than the
share of males, this result is consistent with microeconomic evidence, documenting that single
females are particularly credit-constrained (Ladd, 1982). In fact, the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act was amended in response to persistent evidence that single women were discriminated
against in the credit market. It is reported that unmarried women were often held to much more
rigid credit tests compared to single men (Smith, 1977). Our results suggest that discrimination
at an individual level can be discerned at a more aggregate state-level.
Next, we test the sensitivity of our results to a number of alternative speciﬁcations. Firstly,
we examine the robustness to the sample chosen. To test the importance of the region chosen
we skip in turn single states. It turns out that omission of particular states does not inﬂuence
our results. We also omit in turn single years and ﬁnd that particular years do not unduly aﬀect
our results.9
Secondly, we test the robustness of these results to a number of alternative speciﬁcations of
time, see Table6 in the Appendix. In the ﬁrst set of alternative speciﬁcations we drop the year
ﬁxed eﬀects. Secondly, we include a linear time trend. Then we control for year ﬁxed eﬀects
and a linear time trend. Finally, in the last set of speciﬁcations we allow for year ﬁxed eﬀects
and state-speciﬁc linear time trends. In each alternative set of speciﬁcations the size of the
coeﬃcients and their statistical signiﬁcance remains basically unchanged.
Thirdly, we add additional population control variables. The literature has documented quite
diﬀerent marriage patterns across black and white citizens (Bennett, Bloom, and Craig, 1989;
Brien, 1997; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007a). Therefore, we have repeated all our sets of alter-
native speciﬁcations from Table6, however, in addition controlling for the sex-race-distribution
of each state-year. In particular, we control for the share of the total population of sex s and of
race r, where r is white, black and other.10 The results in Table7 in the Appendix show that
the quantitative eﬀect as well as the statistical signiﬁcance of the stock of married population
increases slightly when we add these six population control variables.
9The corresponding estimation output is available upon request.
10The data on the sex-race-distribution are based on data from the Reading Survey of Epidemiology and End
Results provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
11Finally, we estimate an errors-in-variables regression (Kmenta, 1997) since we measure the
share of the married population with additive noise. Since we do not know the extent of additive
noise, we experiment with various values of reliability R.11 Table 8 shows the estimation results
for the lowest feasible level of reliability 0.98/0.985. Table 9 assumes a reliability of 0.99. The
results obtained by this alternative method a very similar to our previously reported results.
Overall, the ﬁnding that a higher share of married population increases interstate risk sharing
is a very robust ﬁnding. We will now study this phenomenon in greater detail. In particular, in
Section5.1 we will consider diﬀerent divorce law regimes and in Section5.2 we inspect the eﬀect
along the business cycle. In our subsequent analysis we will stick to ordinary least squares based
on the richest speciﬁcation (R2-4).
5.1 The Impact of Divorce Legislation
The eﬀect of marriages on the availability of bank loans, and thus on the extent of risk sharing
across states, depends on the degree of risk sharing within marriages. In reality, the thread-
point of divorce and the fact that intra-marriage transfers cannot be fully legally enforced, may
prevent couples from (full) risk sharing. Hence, we generally expect higher levels of risk-sharing
if the likelihood of divorce is low. Consequently, we also expect a larger eﬀect of marriages
on interstate risk sharing if relationships are stable. In order to observe a variation in the
likelihood of divorce and the extent of risk sharing within marriage we exploit quasi-natural
experiments provided by the reforms of divorce law. First, we consider the move from mutual
consent divorce to unilateral divorce. This reform reduced the cost of divorce and altered marital
stability. Second, we explore the impact of laws relating to the division of matrimonial property
in divorce. Since the move from common property division to equitable property division makes
it easier for banks to assess the net worth of creditors after a potential divorce, we expect more
risk sharing under equitable property division. In both cases our identiﬁcation strategy exploits
variation occurring from the diﬀerent timing of divorce law reforms across US states.
5.1.1 Unilateral Divorce Law
The 1970s was a decade of major change in divorce laws that radically altered the parameters of
family law (Weitzman, 1985). Most importantly, between 1968 and 1977 the majority of states
moved from a divorce law regime which was dominated by mutual consent to so-called unilateral
11The reliability is deﬁned as, R = 1 − (noise variance/total variance), and restricted to be higher than the
R-squared from a regression of the variable measured with noise on all other variables, including the dependent
variable.
12divorce law, see Table10in the Appendix. Under mutual consent, both spouses had to agree in
order to dissolve a marriage legally. Under unilateral divorce, either spouse can ﬁle for divorce
without the consent of his or her partner. First, Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977) argued that
by switching from mutual consent to unilateral divorce one simply transfers the right to divorce
(or to remarry) from the spouse who wants to remain married to the partner desiring a divorce.
If spouses can bargain eﬃciently, the Coase Theorem applies and the divorce law reform should
only aﬀect the distribution of welfare but should have no eﬀect on the incidence of marriage
and divorce. However, there is convincing empirical evidence that divorce does not ﬁt into the
paradigm of costless bargaining12 and that the move from mutual consent to unilateral divorce
laws has aﬀected the incidence of marriage and divorce.13
For our purpose, the introduction of unilateral divorce had two important eﬀects:14 Firstly,
by switching from mutual consent to unilateral divorce law, divorce can be obtained more easily.
It has decreased the cost of divorce. As in any setting of risk sharing under incomplete contracts,
risk sharing decreases when default is less expensive. Hence, we expect that this incentive eﬀect
decreases risk sharing within marriage and therefore also at the interstate-level.
Secondly, analyzing the eﬀects of the unilateral divorce law reform is complicated by a
potential selection eﬀect. The change in the cost of divorce may aﬀect the selection into marriage,
i.e. it may have changed the composition of the stock of married people. Whether this selection
eﬀect increases or decreases the average couples’ match quality depends on the underlying theory
of marriage. If the primary purpose of marriage is to serve as a signaling device or to realize
exogenous beneﬁts, then a reduction in the costs of divorce should lower the match quality of
the average couple. In contrast, when marriage serves as a commitment device, a decrease in
divorce cost should increase the average match quality (Matouschek and Rasul, 2008).
Empirical evidence shows that the dominant reason to marry is the commitment device, and
therefore the move to unilateral divorce law should increase the average couples’ match quality
(Rasul, 2004; Mechoulan, 2006; Rasul, 2006; Matouschek and Rasul, 2008). The theoretical work
12Most likely there are transactions costs arising from liquidity constraints and private information. Moreover,
in many cases other transaction costs such as legally imposed restrictions and lawyers fees have to expected (Halla,
2007).
13There has been a vivid debate in the economics literature whether the move from mutual consent to unilateral
divorce laws has caused the large rise in divorce rates (Peters, 1986; Allen, 1992; Peters, 1992; Friedberg, 1998;
Wolfers, 2006). The last iteration of this debate has shown that unilateral divorce law led to an immediate spike in
the divorce rate that dissipates over time and results in an eventual decline in divorce rates. First the introduction
of unilateral divorce caused the divorce of bad matches (initial spike in divorce rate), and, second it has changed
the selection into marriage. Couples who would have married under mutual consent did not do so under unilateral
divorce (permanent decrease in marriage rates). Bad matches did not marry and we observe a decline in divorce
rates (Rasul, 2006; Matouschek and Rasul, 2008).
14We follow Matouschek and Rasul (2008) and call these eﬀects incentive eﬀect and selection eﬀect.
13by Anderberg (2007) shows that the level of risk-sharing is increasing in the couples’ match-
quality. In his model the match-quality drives both the risk-sharing decision and the divorce
decision. Accordingly, the selection eﬀect of unilateral divorce law should lead to more risk
sharing. Thus, these two eﬀects work in opposite directions. Whether the negative incentive
eﬀect or the positive selection eﬀect dominates is therefore subject to an empirical veriﬁcation.
Moreover, banks may have their own valuation of marriages under mutual consent law versus
unilateral divorce law. It seems plausible that the incentive eﬀect is more apparent to banks.
Therefore, they should value a marriage under mutual consent divorce higher compared to a
marriage under unilateral divorce.
To test the role of unilateral divorce law on risk sharing within marriage and its eﬀect on
interstate risk sharing we estimate (1) and parameterize β as:
β = β0 + β1UitMk
it + β2(1 − Uit)Mk
it, (4)
where Uit = 1 if state i allows unilateral divorce at time t and Uit = 0 otherwise. In our sample,
49.8 percent of state-year observations have unilateral divorce laws. The diﬀerent timing of
divorce law reform across US states ensures identiﬁcation. We control for year ﬁxed eﬀects,
state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc time trends, the sex-race-distribution and allow for a baseline
eﬀect of Mk
it and unilateral divorce law on consumption. Table 2 summarizes the results.
Speciﬁcation(I) shows that under a regime with mutual consent divorce law an increase
in the share of married population by one percentage point is associated with an increase in
smoothed output by 1.2 percentage points. This quantitatively important eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 2-percent level.
Although we obtain an even larger reduction of the exposure of consumption growth to
idiosyncratic income growth for the regime with unilateral divorce, the eﬀect is not statistically
signiﬁcant. We interpret this result as an indication that the introduction of unilateral divorce
has decreased the risk sharing enhancing eﬀect of marriage.
This result supports the idea that risk sharing under incomplete contracts increases in the
cost of default (Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, 2002) and may reduce the availability of bank loans.
The result is also consistent with microeconometric analyses documenting that unilateral divorce
law has decreased risk sharing at the individual level: Based on data from the National Health
Interview Survey Soloveichik (2007) shows that unilateral divorce has dramatically decreased
risk sharing within marriage with respect to health shocks. Similarly, Stevenson (2007) ﬁnds
14Table 2: Risk Sharing, Marriages and Unilateral Divorce Law.a
Specification (I) (II) (III)
k = a k = f k = m
GSP 0.114*** 0.176*** 0.114**
(0.039) (0.038) (0.048)
GSP · M
k · U -0.019 -0.029** -0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.007)
GSP · M
k · (1 − U) -0.012** -0.009* -0.014**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
M
k -0.129 -0.197 -0.077
(0.237) (0.253) (0.227)
U 2.537* 2.798* 2.332*
(1.445) (1.546) (1.369)
(1 − U) 2.544* 2.805* 2.340*
(1.445) (1.546) (1.368)
No. of observations 1,100 1,100 1,100
R-squared 0.122 0.127 0.120
a The dependent variable is a proxy for state consumption
(state retail sales scaled by the ratio of total private consump-
tion to total US retail sales). Each speciﬁcation controls for
year ﬁxed eﬀects, state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc time trends
and for the share of the total population of sex s and of race r,
where r is white, black and other. Estimated using ordinary
least squares. Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering
by states and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in paren-
theses below. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level.
evidence that unilateral divorce reduced investment in various types of marriage speciﬁc capital
such as household specialization, children and spouse’s education. Our results show that this
reduction in risk sharing also shows up at the state-level and has implications for inter-state risk
sharing.
Interestingly, however, speciﬁcations(II) and (III) do not show a uniform picture. Speciﬁ-
cation(II), relying on the share of married females, provides evidence in favor of the selection
eﬀect, since the impact of the share of married female population on risk sharing is larger in
states that allow for unilateral divorce. This result corroborates empirical evidence indicating
that the introduction of unilateral divorce has improved selection into marriage. The shift to,
on average, better matched couples has increased risk sharing within marriage which also shows
up at the state-level. For Speciﬁcation(III) we again obtain a dominating incentive eﬀect. That
is, the impact of the share of the married male population on risk sharing is larger in states that
do not allow for unilateral divorce.
Given that speciﬁcation(II) and (III) give asymmetric results, our two measures for the
extent of marriages do not appear to be substitutes and a sex-speciﬁc eﬀect of unilateral divorce
15concerning risk sharing has to be conjectured.
Overall, however, we conclude that with respect to the impact of marriage on inter-state risk
sharing the incentive eﬀect dominates the selection eﬀect. Therefore, in sum unilateral divorce
has reduced the risk sharing enhancing eﬀect of marriage.
5.1.2 Matrimonial-Property-Division Laws
Another important distinction across state divorce laws relates to the division of matrimonial
property in divorce. Traditionally, states could be classiﬁed as either being in a common property
regime or in an equitable property regime. In the former regime, spouses were generally only
entitled to assets they themselves brought into marriage, while in the latter, property was
generally divided more equally. By the end of the 1970s the majority of US states had moved to
divorce regimes with equitable property division, see Table10in the Appendix. In our sample,
75.7 percent of state-year observations have an equitable property division.
We are now interested in the role of equitable property division on risk sharing within
marriage and its eﬀect on interstate risk sharing. Since equitable property division makes it easier
for banks to assess the net worth of creditors after a potential divorce, it appears conceivable
that banks prefer to lend to married couples under equitable property division. Thus, we expect
to see more risk sharing under equitable property division. In contrast to unilateral divorce law,
the switch to an equitable property regime had negligible eﬀects on the selection into marriage.
Rasul (2004) reports that this law had no eﬀect on ﬁrst marriages. Only the probability of
second marriages went down when property was more equally divided in divorce.
We follow an equivalent empirical strategy as in (4), where we now introduce EPit = 1 if
state i has equitable property division at time t and EPit = 0 otherwise. Again, the diﬀerent
timing of divorce law reforms across US states guarantees identiﬁcation. The estimation results
are summarized in Table3.
It turns out that the divorce laws relating to the division of matrimonial property in divorce
are decisive for the impact of marriages in risk sharing. In state-years with an equitable division
of property across spouses in divorce, risk sharing increases with the share of married population.
According to speciﬁcation(I) an increase in the share of married population by one percentage
point is associated with a decrease of the exposure to state output by 1.8 percentage points.
Based on the share of married females we ﬁnd a larger eﬀect of 2.1 percentage points. Both
estimates are highly statistically signiﬁcant. If we employ the share of married males we can
not identify a statistically signiﬁcant impact.
16Table 3: Risk Sharing, Marriages and Equitable Property Division.a
Specification (I) (II) (III)
k = a k = f k = m
GSP 0.111*** 0.158*** 0.096**
(0.038) (0.035) (0.046)
GSP · M
k · EP -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.008
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
GSP · M
k · (1 − EP) 0.007 0.003 0.011
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
M
k -0.136 -0.183 -0.086
(0.235) (0.253) (0.223)
EP 2.602* 2.799* 2.409*
(1.385) (1.445) (1.341)
(1 − EP) 2.609* 2.806* 2.417*
(1.386) (1.447) (1.342)
No. of observations 1,100 1,100 1,100
R-squared 0.124 0.127 0.121
a The dependent variable is a proxy for state consumption
(state retail sales scaled by the ratio of total private consump-
tion to total US retail sales). Each speciﬁcation controls for
year ﬁxed eﬀects, state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc time trends
and for the share of the total population of sex s and of race r,
where r is white, black and other. Estimated using ordinary
least squares. Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering
by states and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in paren-
theses below. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level.
For the state-years with a common property regime we observe – regardless of the speciﬁca-
tion – no impact of marriages on risk sharing. This result is plausible, since under a common
property regime a divorce restores the distribution of wealth that existed before the marriage.
5.2 The Role of Marriages over the Business Cycle
After adverse shocks to state output, households may need to borrow to smooth their consump-
tion. However, if households are subject to credit constraints, borrowing may not be feasible
and therefore they may not be able to smooth the impact of the shock. Thus, credit may not
be available when it is needed most and consequently, households are particularly exposed to
adverse shocks. Since we argue that marriages help to loosen credit constraints, marriages may
be particularly relevant for risk sharing during economic downturns.
To test this hypothesis, we deﬁne a dummy variable SCit = 1 if the growth rate of real GSP
in State i is above average and SCit = 0 otherwise. Put diﬀerently, we interpret periods of below
average growth as downturns, where agents would have to borrow in order to sustain a certain
17level of consumption. We let β depend on Mk
it and SCit:
β = β0 + β1SCitMk
it + β2(1 − SCit)Mk
it. (5)
This speciﬁcation allows the share of the married population to have a diﬀerent impact on risk
sharing in periods of economic up and downturns. If we use the richest set of control variables
(year ﬁxed eﬀects, state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc time trends, the sex-race-distribution, Mk
it
and SCit), we do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the impact of marriages over
the cycle.
Table 4: Risk Sharing, Marriages and the State Cycle – Alternative Speciﬁcation.a
Specification (I) (II) (III)
k = a k = f k = m
GSP 0.088 0.124** 0.084
(0.054) (0.048) (0.060)
GSP · M
k · SC -0.005 -0.005 -0.002
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
GSP · M
k · (1 − SC) -0.025* -0.036* -0.013*
(0.013) (0.018) (0.008)
M
k -0.111 0.018 -0.191
(0.137) (0.140) (0.124)
SC 0.009 0.000 0.015
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
(1 − SC) 0.004 -0.003 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
No. of observations 1,100 1,100 1,100
R-squared 0.073 0.075 0.072
a The dependent variable is a proxy for state consump-
tion (state retail sales scaled by the ratio of total private
consumption to total US retail sales). Each speciﬁcation
controls for year ﬁxed eﬀects and state ﬁxed eﬀects. Es-
timated using ordinary least squares. Robust standard
errors (allowing for clustering by states and heteroskedas-
ticity of unknown form) in parentheses below. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent level,
5-percent level, and 1-percent level.
However, Table 4 shows that once we drop state speciﬁc time trends, the impact of marriage
on risk sharing is statistically and quantitatively more important in periods of economic down-
turns. We observe that marriages improve risk sharing in all periods – the point estimates are
negative throughout. We also see that marriages exert a quantitatively stronger eﬀect on the
exposure to state-speciﬁc output movements during periods of below average growth. Again, the
largest eﬀect is observed if we employ the share of married females. An increase in the share of
married female population by one percentage point reduces the exposure to state speciﬁc output
18by 3.6 percentage points during an economic downturn. Notably, and in contrast to the results
presented above, we now also ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for the share of married male population.
In sum, this suggests that marriages improve risk sharing when it is most needed, namely
during economic downturns. However, since this result is – in contrast to the previously reported
ﬁndings – sensitive to the speciﬁcation of control variables it has to be interpreted with caution.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the extent to which marriages inﬂuence inter-region risk sharing. We
ﬁnd that US states, where the married population represents a higher fraction of the total
population, manage to share a larger fraction of their idiosyncratic risks. We draw two broad
conclusions from our results: First, even in the US, where highly developed ﬁnancial markets
should be capable of providing substantial risk sharing, informal insurance mechanisms, such as
marriages, still play a role. And second, we ﬁnd that marriages do not only improve risk sharing
at the individual level and within states, but also result in a higher degree of risk sharing across
states. That is, marriages also help to smooth the impact of state-speciﬁc shocks which cannot
be smoothed within states.
We ﬁnd that the design of divorce legislation plays a crucial role. Divorce law does not only
determine the cost of divorce but inﬂuences many aspects of married life. It sets the parameters
for inter-temporal contracting and aﬀects the incentive to invest in marriage-speciﬁc capital.
This has a bearing on risk sharing behavior within marriage which can also be identiﬁed at a
more aggregate state-level. The impact of marriage on interstate-risk sharing has decreased due
to the adoption of unilateral divorce law and increased because of equitable property division.
We also ﬁnd some evidence that the impact of marriage on risk sharing is quantitatively more
important in periods of economic downturns. This result is consistent with our interpretation
that marriage fosters risk sharing by increasing the access to bank credit.
Our results contribute to the discussion on the merits of a high marriage rate. The public
and policy makers alike, seem to worry about the decline in marriage. In the US, for instance,
a large number of policies have been designed to increase the incidence of marriage and to
stabilize existing marriages.15 The compelling public interest in keeping the marriage rate high
can be explained by a number of reasons: First, it can simply be due to preferences (e.g. ethical
15These policies comprise large media campaigns, the re-introduction of covenant marriages (Brinig, 1999), and
the removal of marriage penalties in tax codes (Alm, Dickert-Conlin, and Whittington, 1999), pension systems
(Baker, Hanna, and Kantarevic, 2004) and medicaid programs (Yelowitz, 1998).
19and religious beliefs). And, second, it may be based on the empirical evidence highlighting the
beneﬁcial eﬀects of marriage,16 for which, our paper is a perfect example. We provide evidence
for additional welfare beneﬁts associated with marriage, namely a lower exposure to state speciﬁc
risk.
Although the focus of our paper lies on the risk sharing implications of marriages, the insight
that risk sharing at the individual and more aggregated levels interact appears to be rather
general. Identifying additional channels through which this interaction may occur seems to be an
interesting direction for future research. Finally, we hope to stimulate further research exploring
the relationship between family formation, family dissolution and macroeconomic issues.
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Figure 2: Share of Married Adult Population, United States 1969–1990.






Number of dependents -0.007 (0.006)
Self-employed -0.053** (0.024)
Unemployed -0.005 (0.003)










No. of observations 1,961
Log-likelihood intercept only: -732.742
Log-likelihood full model -592.575
McFadden’s Pseudo R-squared 0.191
a Data used is from Hunter and Walker (1996). The dependent vari-
able is equal to one if mortgage was accepted and zero otherwise.
HRAT is the ratio of monthly housing expenses to monthly income.
OBRAT is the ratio of total monthly obligations to monthly income.
MHIST is equal to one if two or fewer mortgage payments are recorded
as late, and zero otherwise. PUB is equal to one if there are public
record default, and zero otherwise. CHIST is equal to one if there
is no history of delinquent credits (deﬁned as one or more accounts
60 days or more past due), and zero otherwise. MULTI is equal to
one if applicant is purchasing a two- to four-family house, and zero
otherwise. LNPR is the Loan-to-price ratio. THK is equal to one
if there more than two credit reports in the ﬁle, and zero otherwise.
LOC is equal to one if tract vacancy is less than the MSA median,
and zero otherwise. Estimated using probit model. *, ** and *** in-
dicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level,
and 1-percent level. The marginal eﬀect is the change in the prob-
ability of mortgage acceptance caused by an inﬁnitesimal change of
each independent continuous variable or, the discrete change in the
probability for a changing binary variable with all the other variables





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 10: Divorce Law Across the United States.a
Year of Enactment of
Unilateral Divorce Equitable Division
Alabama 1971 1980
Alaska 1935 prior 1950
Arkansas - 1979
Arizona 1973 prior 1950
California 1970 prior 1950
Colorado 1971 1972
Connecticut 1973 1973
District of Columbia - 1977







Iowa 1970 prior 1950








Mississippi - prior 1950
Missouri - 1974
Montana 1975 1976
North Carolina - 1981
North Dakota 1971 prior 1950
Nebraska 1972 1972
New Hampshire 1971 1988
New Jersey - 1971
New Mexico 1973 prior 1950
Nevada 1973 prior 1950





Rhode Island 1976 1979
South Carolina - 1979
South Dakota 1985 prior 1950
Tennessee - 1959
Texas 1974 1970
Utah - prior 1950
Virginia - 1982
Vermont - prior 1950
Washington 1973 1978
Wisconsin - 1978
West Virginia - 1984
Wyoming 1977 prior 1950
a The coding for unilateral divorce law follows Wolfers (2006) and the
coding for equitable property division is based on Rasul (2004).
31